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ABSTRACT
A recent influx of cases on state aid granted to sport undertakings in several EU
Member States has brought to the fore the debate on the interpretation and
application of this particular competition policy provision to the sports sector.
This article reviews the recent Commission decisions on state aid in order to
discuss the extent to which a coherent approach by the Commission can be
found. The article notes the Commission’s readiness to treat support for
sports infrastructure as an aspect of “state responsibility”, which tends to
generate a positive assessment under EU state aid law and contrasts this with
its critical scrutiny of financial support granted to ailing sports clubs, where
the Commission has been more cautious. It also discusses the wider political
and policy implications of the application of European state aid rules to sport.
Its core inquiry is how convincing is the case that sport deserves to be treated
as a special case, distinct from other areas of economic activity?
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KEYWORDS European Union competition law; application of state aid to sport; European Commission;
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1. Introduction
The ruling of the Court of Justice in Walrave1 initiated the develop-
ment of European sports law. Much of the early attention was
devoted to the application of the free movement provisions, especially
following the landmark Bosman case2 and others such as Lehtonen3 and
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1Case C-36/74, Walrave and Koch v Association Union Cycliste Internationale, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140.
2Case C-415/93, Jean Marc Bosman v Union Royale Belge Sociétés de Football Association, ECLI:EU:
C:1995:463.
3Case C-176/96, Jiry Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine v Féderation Royale Belge des Sociétés
de Basketball ASBL (FRBSB), ECLI:EU:C:2000:201.
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Deliège.4 This trend was accompanied by examination of the appli-
cation of competition policy provisions to sport once the Court of
Justice finally tackled this issue in Meca-Medina.5 This ruling explained
the Court’s view that that all regulations of sporting organizations
which exert economic effects are subject to review and that their legal-
ity under competition law can be decided only on a case by case basis.6
This is now to be read in the light of the introduction into the Treaty
with effect from 2009 of Article 165 TFEU, which directs that the
Union shall take into account the “specific nature” of sport, although
this seems more confirmation of the Court’s approach than reforma-
tion.7 However, these developments mostly concerned cases where
internal rules and regulations of sports governing bodies were chal-
lenged as an anticompetitive practice or as an abuse of dominant pos-
ition. The rulings confirm that EU competition law is indeed applicable
to sport, but the interpretation of the law has focused on the appli-
cation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to what are in form private
practices.
There is a public dimension to European sports law which has so far
remained mostly hidden as a result of a lack of cases to adjudicate. This
concerns the legality of state aid granted to the sports sector, which is
subject to control pursuant to Articles 107–109 TFEU. Given the relatively
high number of sport-related legal cases during the last two decades it is
perhaps surprising to see that state aid has been minimally involved
until very recently. This is even more striking if one considers the strategic
importance of sport for the public sector in Europe.8 In many countries
generous subsidies are treated as essential parts of national, regional or
local sport policies.9
The last five years, however, have seen an increase in the number of
cases involving state aid and sport. We have documented a total of 21
cases, with different outcomes. Since 2011, the Commission has taken a
positive decision in 15 sports cases and has decided that the measures
4Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97, Christelle Deliège v Ligue Francophone de Judo et Disciplines Associées
ASBL, ECLI:EU:C:2000:199.
5Case C-519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:
C:2006:492.
6See, for example, Stephen Weatherill, ‘Anti-doping revisited – the demise of the rule of “purely sporting
interest”?’ (2006) 27 ECLR 645.
7As the Court itself confirms in Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais v Olivier Bernard, ECLI:EU:C:2010:153.
8Barrie Houlihan, ‘Public Sector Sport Policy: Developing a Framework for Analysis’ (2005) 40 International
Review for the Sociology of Sport 163.
9Barrie Houlihan and Mick Green (eds) Comparative Elite Sport Development: Systems, Structures and Public
Policy (Butterworth-Heinemann 2008).
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were compatible with the internal market, but there have been also cases
in which state aid was found incompatible with EU law. Broadly, the cases
fall into two groups: those involving support for sports infrastructure,
where the Commission has commonly, but not inevitably, found the aid
to be compatible with the internal market, and those involving financial
aid for sports clubs, where the Commission has been noticeably more cau-
tious when invited to find in favour of the arrangements’ compatibility
with EU state aid law. And whereas the state aid rules are potentially rel-
evant to all sports, most of the recent dossiers relate to football. Indeed, the
latest state aid sport-related cases adjudicated by the Commission as
recently as July 2016 were completely focused on football and concerned
some of Europe’s top professional clubs. Four Dutch football clubs (NEC
Nijmegen, MVV Maastricht, Willem II, Den Bosch) were found to have
received aid provided by local municipalities in the Netherlands which
was compatible with EU law, while one (PSV Eindhoven) was found to
have received no aid at all.10 On the other hand, the Spanish state has
been asked to recover incompatible state aid given to seven professional
football clubs (Real Madrid, FC Barcelona, Athletic Club Bilbao, CA
Osasuna, Valencia CF, Elche CF and Hércules CF).11
The article will now proceed in three steps. First, the general framework
for the application of the state aid rules will be outlined, including refer-
ence to the Treaty direction that the “specific nature” of sport shall be
taken into account. Second, the most recent cases of aid in the sports
sector will be analysed: we separate our analysis dealing first with the
cases concerning infrastructure and, second, those related to subsidies
and concessions made to clubs. Finally, the legal and political conse-
quences will be discussed. At the heart of the inquiry lies the question
of the extent to which the acceptance in the Court’s landmark rulings in
Walrave,12 Bosman13 and Meca-Medina14 that sport is special (though
not quite as special as sports governing bodies typically claim) may be
and should be transplanted from the private dimension of European
sports law to influence also the supervision of public authorities granting
aid. The question is whether an integrated law of sport in the EU’s internal
market, spanning both private practices and public support and respectful
10Commission, ‘State Aid: Commission Clears Support Measures for Certain Football Clubs in the Nether-
lands’ (Press release) IP-16-2402, 4 July 2016.
11Commission, ‘State Aid: Commission Decides Spanish Professional Football Clubs Have to Pay Back
Incompatible Aid’ (Press release) IP-16-2401, 4 July 2016.
12Case C-36/74 (n 1).
13Case C-415/93 (n 2).
14Case C-519/04 (n 5).
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of Article 165 TFEU’s direction to take account of the specific nature of
sport, is emerging.
2. State aid and sport: the application of Articles 107–109 and
the influence of Article 165 TFEU
Articles 107–109 TFEU contain the EU’s system for supervising subsidies
and aid granted by public authorities in the Member States. The pro-
visions are structurally straightforward. A basic prohibition against aid
contained in Article 107(1) is accompanied by two exceptions, the first
a narrow range of aids that according to Article 107(2) are automatically
permitted and the second a more generous, though still tightly controlled,
admission in Article 107(3) that some aid may be treated as lawful.
Article 108 makes clear that the Commission is the institution charged
with the responsibility of deciding whether or not an aid may benefit from
the possibility of exoneration from prohibition pursuant to Article 107(3).
This is facilitated by the obligation imposed by Article 108(3) to notify the
Commission of plans to grant new aid, accompanied by an obligation not
to put proposed measures into effect pending Commission investigation.
Violation of these procedural obligations renders the aid unlawful, which
means that an application may be pursued by an interested third party
before a national court to force its repayment.15 The Commission by con-
trast must assess whether aid is compatible with the internal market even
if it has not been notified. However, although it is not unknown for unno-
tified aid to receive a green light from the Commission,16 this is relatively
uncommon. Non-notification is typically rooted in the grantor’s wish to
hide the aid’s very existence, and consequently it is highly unlikely to
secure approval. In order to wipe out the competitive distortion it has
caused in the market, aid which is not compatible with the internal
market must be recovered by the Member State.
This system grants the Commission a strategically important supervi-
sory role. Article 109 grants the Council a general competence to adopt
Regulations to facilitate the application of Articles 107 and 108, but the
Council and Parliament are largely kept out of detailed decision-
making. Article 108 allows the Council exceptionally to deem aid to be
compatible with the internal market, which subverts the Commission’s
15Reg. 2015/1589, (2015) OJ 248/9; see also Commission Notice on the Enforcement of State Aid Law by
National Courts, (2009) OJ C85/1.
16There are examples among the cases on sport: for example, Case COMP/SA.35501, France Euro 2016,
Case COMP/SA.40168 Willem II.
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primacy, but not least since Council action must be unanimous, it has in
fact been little used.17 The Court has gone out of its way to describe this
provision as “clearly exceptional in character”.18 Article 107(3)(e) allows
the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, to add other categories
of aid to the “may be compatible” list. This is no dead letter – it was, for
example, the basis of a Decision on aid to facilitate the closure of uncom-
petitive coal mines19 – but its use has been infrequent. In fact, the aid rules
are perfect examples of a broader understanding of the EU as a site for
mutual hand-tying backed by credible systems of enforcement, and of
the Commission as the necessarily autonomous decision-maker in
whose (appearance of) impartial judgment all parties choose in
common to place their faith. It means too that the Commission enjoys
a rather wide discretion.
In its assessment of state aid cases, the Commission traditionally
follows the two-step approach that is mapped out by Article 107. First,
the Commission assesses whether the measure at stake qualifies as state
aid; then, if it does qualify, it proceeds to determine whether it should
be treated as compatible with the internal market or not.
According to Article 107(1) TFEU, “any aid granted by a Member State
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threa-
tens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the pro-
duction of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member
States, be incompatible with the internal market”.
The plentiful case law of the Court has elucidated what is at stake in this
definition, and in 2016 the Commission published a helpful Notice on the
notion of a State aid.20 It follows that in order for a measure to qualify as
state aid, the following four cumulative conditions have to be met:
(1) The measure has to be granted out of or through State resources.
It is long established that the notion of aid should be interpreted with
reference to the effect of a measure, not its form or its aim.21 The most
common form of awarding state aid is by means of direct grants. In
17See Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay, The EU Law of Competition, 3rd edn (OUP 2014) 329–37; Conor
Quigley, EU State Aid Law and Policy, 3rd edn (Hart 2015) 497–99.
18Case C-110/02, Commission v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2004:395 [31]. There was bite as well as bark: in the case
the Court annulled Council Decision 2002/114 authorizing Portugal to grant aid to pig farmers.
19Council Decision 2010/787, (2010) OJ L336/24.
20(2016) OJ C262/1.
21For example, Case 173/73, Commission v Italy ECLI:EU:C:1974:71; Case C-241/94 France v Commission
ECLI:EU:C:1996:353; Case C-276/02 Spain v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2004:521. See also Quigley (n 17), chap-
ters 1.1 and 1.2.
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sports cases, the (co)funding of the construction and renovation of an
infrastructure by the State is a key example.22 However, the notion of
aid may readily catch exemption from taxes or social security or any
kind of beneficial fiscal treatment,23 which is increasingly important in
sport cases as we discuss further below. The aid must be imputable to
the State. The term “State” encompasses public authorities at all levels:
national/federal, regional and local.24
(2) The beneficiary of the measure must be an undertaking.
The term “undertaking” is defined broadly and includes “every entity
engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the
entity and the way in which it is financed”.25 Sports clubs shall be con-
sidered undertakings to the extent they carry out economic activities
such as selling broadcasting rights or concluding sponsoring or advertis-
ing agreements.26 Sports associations shall be considered undertakings if
they themselves carry out economic activities such as the commercial
exploitation of a sports event.27
(3) The measure must confer an economic advantage on the beneficiary
undertaking which distorts or threatens to distort competition.
For these purposes an economic advantage is one which the undertak-
ing could not have obtained under normal market conditions. Put another
way, a public authority which is behaving like a private investor is not
granting aid. This is commonly referred to as the “market economy oper-
ator” test. Simple in principle, it is demanding to apply in practice, given
the awkward and frequently hypothetical comparisons that are required.28
In the case of sports infrastructure, the intervention of the State may alter
existing market conditions as a number of new/renovated infrastructures
become available that allow the operators and the users of the
22See, for example, Commission Decision of 18 December 2013, Case COMP/SA.35501, France – EURO
2016; Commision Decision of 2 May 2013, Case COMP/SA.33618, Sweden – Upsala arena.
23Commission, ‘Commission Asks Italy to Change Its Rules on Accounting by Profesional Sports Clubs
(“Salva calcio”)’ (Press release) IP/04/854, 7 July 2004. Commission, ‘Commission Closes Case Against
Italy on Accounting Rules for Profesional Sports Clubs (“Salva calcio”)’ (Press release) IP/05/1271, 13
October 2005.
24Quigley (n 17), chapter 1.3.
25Case 41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macroton GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161 [21].
26See, for example, Case C-519/04, Meca-Medina (n 5)
27See, for example, Case COMP/AT.37398 Joint selling of commercial rights of the UEFA Champions
League, (2003) OJ L 291/25.
28See more on how this principle has been applied in sports cases in Section 3.2 below.
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infrastructure to benefit from facilities that would not be available on
market terms.29
Use of this test led the Commission to decide not to intervene where the
city authorities of Rotterdam had invested in the Ahoy complex, compris-
ing the Sports Palace, other exhibition halls, and a congress centre.30 In
this case the Commission concluded there was no conferral of economic
advantage beyond normal market conditions.31 The terms of the deal were
in line with the normal operation of the market. Thus it fell outwith the
material scope of the state aid rules.
The test also applies to financial support granted to clubs. The Dutch
decisions of 2016 are separable into two groups: that concerning PSV
Eindhoven, where the Commission’s analysis persuaded it that a private
investor would have behaved in a similar manner and where accordingly
there was no aid, and the other four decisions where the examination
revealed that aid had been granted, and so an inquiry into its compatibility
with the internal market was conducted.32
As part of this criterion the measure must favour particular undertak-
ings. This is commonly referred to as the requirement that the measure be
selective in order to fall within the scope of Article 107. A measure of
general application to all relevant undertakings in a Member State
escapes the supervision asserted by State aid law.33 This condition is ful-
filled when only a limited number of sports or only a limited number of
clubs benefit from a measure. In the case of infrastructure, selectivity is
particularly evident where the construction or renovation of infrastructure
qualifies as “dedicated infrastructure” for one or a few beneficiaries.34
Where financial support is directed at individual clubs, the requirement
is readily satisfied.
(4) The measure has to affect intra-EU trade.
29See, for example, Commission Decision of 9 November 2011, Case COMP/SA.31722, Hungary – Support-
ing the Hungarian sport sector via tax benefit scheme, point 80; Commission Decision of 20 November
2013, Case COMP/SA.37109, Belgium – Football stadiums in Flanders, point 25; Commission Decision
of 18 December 2013, Case COMP/SA.35501, France – EURO 2016, point 262.
30Commission Decision of 21 October 2008, Decision 2009/713, The Netherlands – Investment by the muni-
cipality of Rotterdam in the Ahoy complex, (2009) OJ L 248/28.
31A challenge to this Decision was treated as inadmissible in Case T-90/09 Mojo Concerts BV et Amsterdam
Music Dome Exploitatie BV v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2012:30.
32Section 3.2.1 below.
33Quigley (n 17) chapters 1.4 and 1.5.
34Commission Decision of 9 November 2011, Case COMP/SA.317220, Hungary – Supporting the Hungarian
sport sector via tax benefit scheme, point 77.
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Since competitions between professional sports clubs have a clear inter-
national dimension and many tournaments have a European or world-
wide dimension, the measures normally easily meet the required
element of exerting an effect on intra-EU trade.35 Given the transnational
character of not only football competitions but also the transfer market
and markets for broadcasting, sponsorship and merchandise there is no
difficulty in finding the required inter-State dimension even where rela-
tively small clubs are in receipt of aid.36
The Block Exemption on de minimis aid might on occasion help to
shelter aid from scrutiny.37 Its Article 3(2) contains the basic rule, sup-
ported by sector-specific adornment. The total amount of de minimis
aid granted per Member State to a single undertaking shall not exceed
€200,000 over any period of three fiscal years. Crossing that threshold trig-
gers an obligation to notify the aid to the Commission.
If there is aid according to these four criteria discussed above, the
matter turns to the second stage: the assessment conducted by the Com-
mission into whether the aid is compatible with the internal market. So
far, all positive Commission decisions in the recent sports cases were
assessed on the basis of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU which states that: “Aid
to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading con-
ditions to an extent contrary to the common interest” may be considered
to be compatible with the common market.38
In order to assess whether a measure is compatible under Article 107
(3)(c) TFEU, the Commission balances positive and negative effects of
the aid.39 In applying the balancing test, the Commission assesses
whether the state aid pursues a policy objective of common interest, is
35See, for example, Commission Decision of 9 November 2011, Case COMP/SA.317220, Hungary – Support-
ing the Hungarian sport sector via tax benefit scheme, point 81; Commission Decision of 20 November
2013, Case COMP/SA.37109, Belgium – Football stadiums in Flanders, point 26; Commission Decision
of 18 December 2013, Case COMP/SA.35501, France – EURO 2016, point 263.
36For example, Case COMP/SA.40168 Willem II, esp. paras 15, 39–40; Case COMP/SA.41614 Den Bosch,
paras 7, 62–63.
37Regulation 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid (2013) OJ L352/1.
38Other paragraphs of Article 107(3) might in future become relevant. Aid ‘to promote the economic
development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious under-
employment’ might fit sport as a tool of regional policy; aid ‘to promote the execution of an important
project of common European interest’ might touch sport; and also included on the list is ‘aid to promote
culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in
the Union to an extent that is contrary to the common interest’, which might at a stretch, and supported
by reference to Article 167(4) TFEU, apply to some aspects of sporting activity.
39See, for example, Commission Decision of 9 November 2011, Case COMP/SA.31722, Hungary – Support-
ing the Hungarian sport sector via tax benefit scheme, point 85; Commission Decision of 20 November
2013, Case COMP/SA.37109, Belgium – Football stadiums in Flanders, point 29.
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necessary and appropriate and does not cause undue distortion of compe-
tition. In cases involving support for clubs in financial difficulty the focus is
on the Commission’s Guidelines on aid for rescue and restructuring, which
constitute a concrete application of the “gateway” found in Article 107
(3)(c).40 Of particular significance to aid for infrastructure today is Regu-
lation 651/2014, which is the Block Exemption Regulation applicable to
state aid.41 This document, which contains 59 Articles and three Annexes
and stretches over 78 pages of the Official Journal, sets out at great length
the criteria that determine whether particular forms of aid are to be
treated as compatible with the internal market. Its Article 55 addresses
“aid for sport and multifunctional recreational infrastructures” and pro-
vides that such aid is to be treated as compatible with the internal market
within the meaning of Article 107(3) TFEU and so is exempted from the
notification requirement of Article 108(3) TFEU provided that the con-
ditions set out in the Regulation are met.
Regulation 651/2014’s predecessor did not mention sport at all, so this
is a watershed which suggests a need for separate treatment of Commis-
sion practice before the entry into force of the Regulation and practice
afterwards, beginning in July 2014. This article respects this pattern, but
equally it cautions that the Regulation is not transformative. It is essen-
tially a codification of Commission practice; its concern is only for infra-
structure projects, not wider matters that arise in cases of aid granted in
the sports sector such as aid to ailing clubs, and, most of all, it offers no
serious engagement with the intellectual heart of this subject, which is
the impact of Article 165 TFEU. Regulation 651/2014 pays mere lip
service to Article 165, confining it to a passing reference in the Preamble.42
The important point is that, besides the block exemption, the Commission
has begun to make use also of Article 165 TFEU in order to shape its treat-
ment of sport as an economic activity subject to the Treaties. The potential
significance of this is high. Free movement law had its Bosman,43 compe-
tition law itsMeca-Medina.44 State aid awaits the landmark judgment that
will elucidate how far EU law is to be adapted to pay due respect to the
claim that sport is special. Even though Article 165 TFEU is not formally
horizontal in nature, the Court was in the past willing to absorb the non-
40Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty (2014) OJ
2014, C249/01.
41Commission Regulation 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with
the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (2014) OJ, L187/1.
42ibid recital 74.
43Case C-415/93, Bosman (n 2) [106].
44Case C-519/04 P Meca-Medina (n 5), especially [42]–[45].
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binding Amsterdam Declaration on Sport in applying internal market
law45 so there is no likelihood of it taking any lesser view of Article 165,
which is binding. Olympique Lyonnais v Olivier Bernard, in which the
Court ruled that the legal assessment of the transfer system as a restriction
on free movement shall embrace “the specific characteristics of sport in
general, and football in particular, and of their social and educational
function” provides ample confirmation.46 The Court there added that
“the relevance of those factors is also corroborated by their being men-
tioned in the second subparagraph of Article 165(1) TFEU”.47
So state aid law is constitutionally connected to Article 165’s commit-
ment to the “specific nature of sport”. The key question is what this, in
fact, means in concrete terms for analysis of state aid in the context of
sport. The European Commission’s 2007 White Paper on Sport makes no
mention at all of state aid.48 The supporting and much longer Staff
Working Document contains a brief comment on state aid rules.49 The
comment begins with the observation that “there are very few decisions
so far”where theCommission has applied the Treaty rules to sport. Accord-
ing to the Commission staff document, public support measures in sport
generally finance either infrastructure or activities of individual sports
clubs.
The document states that public financing related to the construction of
sports infrastructure can be considered not to constitute state aid, pro-
vided that certain conditions are fulfilled. To clarify this general statement,
the document makes reference to a letter from the European Commis-
sion’s Directorate-General for Competition to Germany regarding State
funding for the Hannover football stadium.50 This case dates back to
the year 2000 when the organization of the 2006 FIFA World Cup was
assigned to Germany. Where (1) the type of infrastructure involved is gen-
erally unlikely to be provided by the market because it is not economically
viable; (2) it is not apt selectively to favour a specific undertaking; and (3)
where it is a facility needed to provide a service that is considered as being
part of the typical responsibility of the public authority to the general
public, the matter will escape the EU’s state aid rules. The elaboration
of the Commission’s practice in cases involving infrastructure, and the
45Cases C-51/96 & 191/97 Deliège (n 4), [41]–[42]; Case C-176/96 Lehtonen (n 3) [32]–[33].
46Case C-325/08, Bernard (n 7) [40].
47ibid.
48Commission ‘White Paper on Sport’ COM (2007) 391, 11 July 2007.
49Commission, ‘The EU and Sport: Background and Context – Accompanying Document to the White
Paper on Sport’ SEC (2007) 935, para 3.2.2.
50ibid para 3.2.2, fn 73.
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adoption of sports-specific treatment of aid for infrastructure in Article 55
of Regulation 651/2014, is the subject of dedicated examination further
below.
In relation to public subsidies to individual clubs, the Commission’s
2007 staff working document concluded rather brusquely that although
amateur clubs are generally not considered as undertakings within the
meaning of EU state aid law, with the consequence that subsidies
granted to such clubs are generally not covered by state aid rules, by con-
trast professional sports clubs are engaged in economic activities, and so
there is no compelling argument why they should be exempted from
state aid rules. In fact, the document went further and stated that:
The need to ensure competitive equality between players, clubs and compe-
titions as well as the necessity to ensure uncertainty of results can in fact be
guaranteed most effectively by the application of State aid rules, which are
meant to establish a level playing field and ensure that States or municipalities
that are most willing or able to grant subsidies to their clubs will not disrupt fair
competition.51
This far-sighted observation has a sharp bite when one comes to consider
the July 2016 decisions concerning Spain’s leading football clubs. This
matter too is examined more fully below in Section 3.2.2 of this article.
The European Commission’s 2011 Communication on sport touches
upon the topic of state aid even more briefly.52 After a few general
lines, it simply repeats that there have only been a few decisions concern-
ing State aid to sport. As a concluding statement, it is mentioned that “as
in other sectors in a similar situation, stakeholders have repeatedly called
for further clarification regarding the financing of infrastructure and sport
organisations”.53
While reference to some sport-related cases has been made already, we
move to discuss the most recent decisions of the Commission in the appli-
cation of state aid rules to sport. It will be evident that at least some rec-
ognition of the special character of sport is emerging. This reveals that, as
has already occurred in connection with EU free movement and compe-
tition law, the application of state aid law too requires a degree of sensi-
tivity to the special nature of sport, as foreseen by Article 165 TFEU.
51ibid para 3.2.2.
52Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Euro-
pean Econmomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on developing the European
dimension of sport’ COM (2011) 12 final, 18 January 2011.
53ibid para 3.3.
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3. Analysis of recent Commission decisions: in search of the
specificity of sport under state aid law
There has been a clear surge in sport-related state aid cases over the last
few years. A total of 21 European Commission decisions have been ident-
ified since 2011. One can identify two groups of activities that are being
targeted for investigation as potentially illegal state aid. On the one
hand, there are those instances in which public authorities (mostly local
and/or regional) participate in the construction or refurbishment of
sports venues. On the other hand, there are cases where sports clubs are
directly helped by the authorities through tax/debt relief schemes, finan-
cial backing, real estate operations, or a combination of these. The analysis
that follows respects this twofold division.
3.1. State aid and sports infrastructure
The large number of cases linked to the building or renovation of
sporting venues with positive decisions (a selection of which is ana-
lysed below) demonstrate that the European Commission considers
the state measures (if criteria are met) are compatible with Article
107(3) TFEU in that area. This was already evident in the case of
the Hannover football stadium that we analysed previously in the
article, and where the Commission sent a letter to Germany explaining
under which conditions aid for building stadiums may be permited.54
This thinking of the Commission paved the way to the adoption of
sport-specific treatment of aid for sport and multifunctional rec-
reational infrastructure in Article 55 of Regulation 651/2014, the
Block Exemption Regulation.55
Regulation 651/2014 replaced Regulation 800/2008, the previously
applicable Block Exemption, which did not refer to sport at all. So this
created new regulatory terrain. Article 1(1)(k) brings “aid for sport and
multifunctional recreational infrastructures” within the Block Exemption
Regulation’s scope. What is at stake here is the circumstances in which
public authorities may subsidize the construction or operation of a facility
that will be used by a professional sports club. Article 55 provides a careful
explanation of what room for manoeuvre is permitted to public
54See also Michael Gerlinger, ‘Stadiums for FIFA World Cup Germany 2006 and European Law on State Aid:
A Case of Infrastructure Measures?’ (2003) 3 International Sports Law Journal 9.
55Commission Regulation (EU) 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible
with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, (2014) OJ L187/1.
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authorities. The key features, each granted detailed treatment in the 12
intricate paragraphs of Article 55, are that there shall not be a single pro-
fessional sport user;56 and that access, pricing and usage shall proceed on a
transparent and non-discriminatory basis; and that the amount of aid
shall be strictly controlled according to rules that govern the permitted
relationship between eligible costs and operating profit and loss.
Article 4(bb) withdraws the exemption from investment aid for sports
and multifunctional infrastructures which exceeds €15 million or the total
costs exceeding €50 million per project, and from operating aid for sports
infrastructure which exceeds €2 million per infrastructure per year. Article
4(2) adds that the thresholds shall not be circumvented by artificially split-
ting up the aid schemes or aid projects. Bigger projects need to secure an
individual exemption and so need to be notified to the Commission.
The tension in the content of these exemptions is between the general
value to the community of the availability of high-quality infrastructure on
the one hand and, on the other, the normal and indeed commercially sen-
sible pattern where one or two large sports clubs typically become the
dominant user of sports arenas. As a general rule the closer the project
conforms to the former pattern, the more likely that public funding in
its support is to secure the approval of the Commission. It would be poss-
ible to view this tension through the prism of Article 165 TFEU but, as
mentioned above, Regulation 651/2014 is barren of concrete reliance on
Article 165 TFEU. This is not true of the Commission’s Decisions,
though. In consequence, the quest to gain insight into the beating intellec-
tual heart of EU sports law needs to look beyond the Regulation, the value
of which is predominantly focused on practice and planning. Thus, we
need to engage with the intricacies of the Commisison’s individual
decisions, and in particular their reliance on Article 165 TFEU.
Therefore the article turns now to discuss in more depth the signifi-
cance of a selection of the most relevant cases in relation to sports infra-
structure. We will deal, in turn, with the Commission decisions relating to
football stadiums in Flanders, the new multisport arena in Copenhagen
and the building of stadiums in France in preparation for the 2016 Euro-
pean football championships (EURO 2016). An overall assessment is then
provided.
56The regulation’s definition section, Art 2(143), provides that professional sport “means the practice of
sport in the nature of gainful employment or remunerated service, irrespective of whether or not a
formal labour contract has been established between the professional sportsperson and the relevant
sport organisation, where the compensation exceeds the cost of participation and constitutes a signifi-
cant part of the income for the sportsperson. Travel and accommodation expenses to participate to the
sport event shall not be considered as compensation for the purposes of this Regulation”.
EUROPEAN COMPETITION JOURNAL 13
3.1.1. Football stadiums in Flanders
The Commission decided to raise no objections in Football stadiums in
Flanders.57 Belgium had notified the Commission of the Flemish govern-
ment’s plan to grant €8 million in aid to support the renovation and the
construction of multifunctional football stadiums as part of a scheme to
ensure that professional football in Flanders “generates a higher social
return”, while also improving the quality of stadiums used for professional
football. The Commission readily classified this as aid within the meaning
of Article 107: it was granted exclusively from public funds; it conferred an
economic advantage on owners and users of stadiums (and Commission
noted that football clubs should be considered as “undertakings”); selectiv-
ity was present because the measure targeted only stadiums used by first
and second league football clubs located in Flanders or Brussels; and dis-
tortion of competition flowed from that benefit that was made available
locally, which in turn affected inter-State trade because “competition
between professional football clubs clearly has an international dimen-
sion”.58 In any event the measure was aimed at adapting stadiums to
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) criteria for European
football games.
The Commission therefore turned to assessment in the light of Article
107(3)(c) TFEU, which in sports cases is the most important of the gate-
ways and which provides that “aid to facilitate the development of certain
economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not
adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common
interest may be treated as compatible with EU law”.
The Commission found, first, that the project of renovating stadiums
“can be considered a State responsibility towards the general public”
and in making this bold assertion, examined further below, it relied expli-
citly on the Amsterdam Declaration on Sport and on Article 165 TFEU,
which, it noted, “both acknowledge the social significance of sport”. It
lauded too sport’s educational role, as well as its social, cultural and
health dimension. The aim of the measure is “to realize multifunctional
football stadiums in order to ensure that professional football in Flan-
ders/Brussels Capital Region generates a higher social return, while at
the same time improving the quality of stadiums used for professional
football”.59 It noted too the project’s emphasis on multifunctional use of
57Case COMP/SA.37109, Belgium – Football stadiums in Flanders.
58ibid point 26.
59ibid point 3.
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the football stadium in order to achieve broader societal goals: the stadium
“should have an added value for society”.60
The aid was found to be well-targeted in the sense that it addresses a
specific problem, that of under-investment in football infrastructure,
and moreover support for upgrade was tied to establishing social return.
In short: “Without jeopardising the primary football objective, the subsi-
dised infrastructures should thus be opened to the general public. This will
ensure that several different types of users and sectors should be able to
benefit from the subsidized facilities”.61
Finally, the Commission agreed that the distortion of competition and
the effect on trade was limited. Promised transparency was approved as a
means to enable third parties (including competitors) to verify whether
the aid was justified and its conditions fulfilled. And the promise to set
prices by benchmarking was approved as a means to prevent distortion
of competition to the detriment of privately owned and funded facilities.62
Plainly this anxiety about the need for transparency has been eagerly
carried over into the terms set by Article 55 of Block Exemption Regu-
lation 651/2014, considered above.
3.1.2. Financing of a new multiarena in Copenhagen
The Commission proceeded to a formal approval of Financing of a new
multiarena in Copenhagen.63 The city planned to co-fund the building
of a multiarena offering facilities for music, culture and sport, seating
up to 15,000 people. That the aid was granted through State resources
was plain. It was in the view of the Commission at least plausible that a
selective economic advantage would result at one or all of the relevant
levels, namely construction, operation and/or use of the arena. Public
co-financing of the multiarena was capable of distorting competition
and having an effect on trade between Member States (especially
between Denmark and Sweden, and potentially Germany too). The key
question therefore focused on whether the aid could be treated as compa-
tible with the internal market. The Commission took a favourable view.
Article 107(3)(c) was once again the gateway. The Commission con-
sidered that the project would benefit the general public and that what
was at stake “can be considered as a State responsibility, particularly in
60ibid point 12.
61ibid point 38.
62Supervision of disparate pricing mechanisms is probably the most awkward and ad-hoc issue arising in
these several decsions: Richard Craven, ‘State Aid and Sports Stadiums: EU Sports Policy or Deference to
Professional Football’ (2014) E.C.L.R. 453.
63Commission Decision of 15 May 2008, Case COMP/SA.33728, Denmark – Multiarena Copenhagen.
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light of the Amsterdam Declaration on Sport and Article 165 of the
Treaty”.64 The Commission also relied on Article 167(4): the arena
would promote cultural diversity in the common interest. Moreover, the
Commission, after examination of alternatives, was persuaded that the
new facility would complement rather than compete with existing
venues: it would lead to more events being staged. This was true not
only of Danish venues but also those in Sweden, in particular that in
Malmö, closely situated over the bridge from Copenhagen. The Commis-
sion also noted that private financing of the venture was demonstrably not
forthcoming, and that the State’s support was limited to bridging the gap
between what could be secured on the market and what was needed. And
use of the multiarena would be pursued on a non-discriminatory basis
with no “captive user”.
3.1.3. France 2016
In December 2013 the Commission announced it would raise no objec-
tions to the plans to renovate football stadiums in France in preparation
for the European Football championships to be held in that country in
2016.65 That the matter was notified was itself proof of the rising profile
of EU state aid law applied to sport: the arrangements for supporting con-
struction of stadia for the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany came to the
attention of the Commission only after two complaints were lodged.66 The
2016 project, based on several different models of funding explained in
detail in the documentation, had been notified to the Commission by
the French authorities and covered the renovation and subsequent use
of nine stadiums, in Bordeaux, Marseille, Lille, Nice, Saint-Étienne, Tou-
louse, Paris, Lens and Lyon. Only the stadium in Lyon is privately owned.
After examination of the specific features of each of the nine arrange-
ments, the Commission proceeded to find that there was state aid
within the meaning of Article 107. Support through State resources was
plainly present. An advantage was selectively conferred on particular
undertakings, which would be able to provide services by using the sta-
diums. In some cases this would be achieved through a private
company, in others by the public authority itself acting as an economic
operator. Moreover each stadium, which was used only for the duration
of a single month in the summer of 2016 for the tournament, is designed
in the longer term to be used principally by a top-level French professional
64ibid point 34.
65Commission Decision, Case COMP/SA.35501.
66Craven (n 62).
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football club, the “captive user”. The public authorities were not acting
purely as would a private investor. The Commission also readily identified
the necessary effect on competition and on trade between Member States.
The stadiums would be used for major football and other cultural events
that would be of international interest. The very plan was to compete with
facilities in other Member States (and beyond) to secure the right to stage
major events.
The question was whether the aid should be treated as compatible with
the internal market. France relied on Article 107(3)(c) and the Commis-
sion agreed that the criteria were met. The project pursued a matter of
common interest and was structured in a way that was necessary and pro-
portionate to achieve its ends and did not cause any undue distortion of
competition. The Commission referred to the support involved as
capable of being considered as a State responsibility, and referred to
both the Amsterdam Declaration on Sport and Article 165 TFEU, as
well as Article 167(4) on cultural diversity. It emphasized too the multi-
functional virtues involved, stretching beyond the “captive user” football
clubs. France could not aspire to such ambitious plans without this
project – in particular the need to satisfy UEFA’s stadium requirements
is stressed by the Commission – and it would not be delivered by the
private sector acting without State intervention. It would, in the view of
the Commission complement, not replace existing different facilities.
The Commission also stressed that compliance with EU public contract-
ing rules and other applicable legal rules would limit the State support to
that strictly required. It examined too and was satisfied by the structures
for payment by the “captive user”, the clubs and other future users.
The Commission’s decision was limited to the aid needed for construc-
tion and renovation. As the conditions for the further commercial exploi-
tation and use of the stadiums were not yet fully defined, France
committed to notify the outstanding conditions of exploitation and use
of the stadiums after the championship. France would also set up a
control mechanism in order to guarantee market conditions for the use
of resident clubs.67
3.1.4. Overall assessment: a broadly favourable approach
As explained above, Article 55 of Regulation 651/2014 has assumed a
central role for future assessment of the compatibility with EU law of
67Commission, ‘State Aid: Commission Approves French Aid for Construction and Rennovation of Stadiums
for UEFA EURO 2016 Championship’ (Press release) IP/13/1288, 18 December 2013.
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projects of this type, but its shape is heavily influenced by pre-existing
Commission practice, especially the cases analysed above. Thus, they
remain vividly helpful in showing the Commission’s thinking. Moreover,
any project that is unable to take advantage of the gateway that is Article
55 of the Block Exemption Regulation will need to be shaped with careful
awareness of what the Commission has approved in the past. The
Decisions in Flanders and France reveal a broadly comparable – and posi-
tive – assessment by the Commission. They follow a very similar reason-
ing, using almost the same arguments, to achieve the same results. A
closely comparable approach was also taken in 2013, as plans to
support the construction of multifunctional arenas in Erfurt,68 Jena69
and Chemnitz70 were found compatible with the internal market pursuant
to Article 107(3)(c). Swedish plans for a new arena in Uppsala were
treated in the same way71 and so too were plans to renovate three stadia
in Northern Ireland.72 Thus, a clear pattern is found here, which in
turn offers a model for those engaged in planning such schemes in future.
A broader scheme in Hungary, involving granting tax concessions in
order to induce undertakings to contribute to supporting training of
young people, costs of personnel and creation or modernization of
sports infrastructure, was notified and approved in 2011.73 The aid,
focused on the country’s five most popular team sports (football, bas-
ketball, ice hockey, water polo and handball), fell within the scope of
EU rules but was compatible with them by virtue of Article 107
(3)(c). The analytical structure follows that used in the cases dealing
with stadium construction and the Commission cites Article 165
(though not on this occasion the Amsterdam Declaration on Sport).
It should be appreciated that simple invocation of Article 165 is not
enough to shelter aid from Commission condemnation. In 2014 the
Commission decided that three companies that owned the German
Nürburgring racetrack had received aid from the Land Rheinland-
Pfalz in the period 2002–2012 that was incompatible with the internal
68Commission Decision of 20 March 2013, Case COMP/SA.53135, Germany – Multifunktionsarena der Stadt
Erfurt.
69Commission Decision of 20 March 2013, Case COMP/SA.35440, Germany – Multifunktionsarena der Stadt
Jena.
70Commission Decision of 2 October 2013, Case COMP/SA.36105, Germany – Fussballstadion Chemnitz.
71Commission Decision of 2 May 2013, Case COMP/SA.33618, Sweden – Uppsala arena.
72Commission Decision of 9 April 2014, Case COMP/SA.37342, United Kingdom – Regional stadia develop-
ment in Northern Ireland.
73Commission Decision of 9 November 2011, Case COMP/SA.31722, Hungary – Supporting the Hungarian
sport sector via tax benefit scheme.
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market.74 The scheme fell outside the scope of permitted aid for the
rescue and restructuring of ailing undertakings, as set out in Commis-
sion Guidelines which interpret Article 107(3)(c) TFEU in this
context.75 In particular Germany failed to notify a restructuring plan
and there was no evidence that aid granted was the minimum necess-
ary.76 Germany’s submissions included appeal to the common interest
in the construction of sports facilities and, specifically, to Article 165
TFEU,77 but the Commission simply ignored this in its findings. Pre-
sumably it did not disagree that Article 165 is relevant to assessment of
aid for sports infrastructure, but Article 165 cannot help where what is
at stake is inadequately planned restructuring of existing failing
facilities.
The treatment of these several projects aimed at proving multi-purpose
facilities, reflected now in Article 55 of the Block Exemption, clearly
reveals a readiness to find a benefit in the common interest as a result
of public funding, even where the main beneficiary is likely to be a pro-
fessional football club. Heavy emphasis on transparency and non-dis-
crimination in the operation of the stadiums is plain. In fact, this
procedural dimension is a feature of internal market law generally.78
And, of broader intellectual significance, these Decisions help to explore
just how special sport truly is in the development of EU state aid law –
this is very much the missing piece of the internal market jigsaw as far
as EU sports law and policy is concerned.
We turn now to the second group of investigations, those dealing with
advantages to particular clubs. These are particularly helpful in charting
the limits of acceptance of sport’s special nature.
3.2. Tax and other advantages granted to clubs
In contrast with the generally positive view granted by the Commission to
the building of sports infrastructure, there is a more mixed view adopted
in the examination of tax and other advantages granted directly to clubs.
The most significant Decisions are those of July 2016, in which the Com-
mission took a broadly positive view of measures adopted in support of
74Commission Decision of 1 October 2014, Case COMP/SA.31550 and Case COMP/SA.34890, Nurbűrgring;
December 2016/151 (2016) OJ L34/1.
75The current version is at (2014) OJ C249/1.
76para 219.
77para 83, citing Case COMP/SA.31722 Hungary – Supporting the Hungarian sport sector via tax benefit
scheme.
78For example, Case C-219/07, Nationale Raad van Dierenkwekers en Liefhebbers VZW, ECLI:EU:C:2008:353,
[33]–[39]; Joined Cases C-186/11 and 209/11 Stanleybet International, ECLI:EU:C:2013:33 [47].
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Dutch professional football clubs and a remorselessly negative view of
measures addressed to leading Spanish football clubs, who are in conse-
quence required to divest themselves of a number of advantages. The
aim here is to discern the Commission’s current view of what types of
advantage states may grant sports clubs in Europe without falling fall of
the restraint exercised by state aid law; and in particular whether the
assessment is affected by recognition of the specificity of the sports sector.
The Commission sent a request for information in 2012 to all Member
States.79 The letter mentions that the Commission had received com-
plaints from citizens from different Member States indicating a number
of state aid measures in favour of professional football clubs. At the
same time, the Commission observed that very few measures had been
notified to it, even though Article 108(3) TFEU requires notification by
public authorities of plans to grant aid and imposes a “standstill” obli-
gation on the grantor pending Commission investigation. Therefore, the
Commission requested Member States to provide information on all
measures supporting professional football clubs, in particular with
regard to specific fiscal and social security regimes.80
3.2.1. Aid to Dutch football clubs
In 2013 the Commission opened an investigation into allegations that five
municipalities in the Netherlands had granted aid to local professional
football clubs (NEC Nijmegen, MVV, Willem II Tilburg, PSV Eindhoven
and FC Den Bosch).81 None of the aid had been notified. This did not
mean that the aid – if it be aid – is inevitably incompatible with EU
law: the Commission must make that inquiry. It proceeded to do so.
It announced its findings on 4 July 2016. In one case, that concerning
PSV Eindhoven, the Commission concluded after a careful evaluation that
the deal, involving sale of the stadium to the municipality and a lease back
to the club, was one into which a private investor would also have
entered.82 This aligned with a decision already disposed of in 2013, in
which the Commission decided that no State aid was involved where
the municipality of Arnhem, to which the local club Vitesse owed
79Commission, ‘State Aid to Professional Football Clubs, Letter of the European Commission Competition
DG to the Permanent Representation of the Member States’ COMP/C4/WP/AH/ZZ/md – D*2012/98568,
letter on file with the authors. See also Commission, ‘State Aid: Commission Opens In-depth Investi-
gation into Public Funding of Certain Spanish Professional Football Clubs’ (Press release) IP/13/1287,
18 December 2013.
80ibid 4.
81Commission Decision of 6 March 2013, Case COMP/SA.33584, The Netherlands – Alleged municipal aid to
the professional Dutch football clubs Vitesse, NEC, Willem II, MVV, PSV and FC Den Bosch in 2008–2011.
82Case COMP/SA.41613, Aid to Dutch football club PSV; December 2016/1849 (2016) OJ L 282/75.
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money, accepted a much reduced sum in settlement for fear that the club
would become bankrupt were the full debt demanded.83 A private market
creditor would have acted in the same way – indeed several reportedly
had.
The treatment of the other four clubs, NEC, MVV, Willem II and FC
Den Bosch, was different, albeit a similar outcome was reached – that
the grant of aid was not precluded by EU law. In each case support had
been granted by local public authorities because the clubs were in financial
difficulties. A private economic actor would not have acted in this way, so
this was aid within the meaning of EU law. There is room to find aid com-
patible with EU law where it is used to rescue and restructure firms in dif-
ficulty, but the circumstances in which this is permitted are carefully
confined in Commission’s guidelines. These currently exist in a 2014
version, and are in essence a concrete application to the particular instance
of restructuring of the “gateway” found in Article 107(3)(c),84 although in
fact it was the earlier 2004 version which governed the cases at hand. The
principal concern is, in short, that the aid granted shall be tied to a realistic
plan for restructuring the undertaking’s business and placing it on a viable
footing and, moreover, the guidelines assert a “one time, last time” prin-
ciple in order to reduce moral hazard, excessive risk-taking incentives and
potential competitive distortions which flow from the grant of rescue
aid.85
The Commission accepts that in principle football clubs may benefit in
this way, as may firms in any other sector, but its preliminary assessment
in 2013 found serious doubts whether the criteria were met. Thus, a full
investigation was warranted. The Commission at the time mentioned
Article 165 TFEU, but did not find it of assistance to the clubs in the par-
ticular circumstances that had arisen.
The 2016 final decisions, however, give a green light to the measures
adopted in favour of the four clubs. The Commission approved the
restructuring plan and found no violation of the “one time, last time” prin-
ciple. Interestingly, Willem II does not cite Article 165 TFEU at all;86 the
same is true of Den Bosch.87 MVV, however, mentions it but only in brus-
quely denying that sport can benefit from the “cultural exception”
83Case COMP/SA.33584 (n 81).
84Commission, ‘Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in diffi-
culty’ (2014) OJ C249/01.
85ibid para 70.
86Case COMP/SA.40168, Willem II.
87Case COMP/SA.41614, Den Bosch.
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contained in Article 107(3)(d).88 NEC simply notes that “due account” is
taken of Article 165 but makes no further use of it in the legal analysis.89
Here the crucial point is that sport is not special. Certainly the assessment
is sensitive to the sporting context in which the restructuring occurs. A
football club cannot change its core activity, but it can cut its costs. So,
for example, the Commission notes how Willem II had sold players,
paid reduced wages and retained a smaller squad than previously and
that, doubtless in part as a consequence, had suffered relegation.90 But
this is not to rely on Article 165 TFEU or, more generally, on the
special features of sport to induce a more generous attitude to aid
granted to ailing football clubs than to rescue aid more generally: it is
only to provide a detailed application of the rules govering rescue aid in
the particular economic context in which it arises, here football. The Com-
mission, in short, was treating professional football like any other
industry.
3.2.2. Aid to Spanish football clubs
Also in 2013 the Commission turned its attention to Spain and to some of
the most famous and successful clubs in the history of the game of football.
At stake are several issues. First, tax privileges alleged to have been enjoyed
by Real Madrid, FC Barcelona, Athletic Club Bilbao, and CA Osasuna as
result of a special status held by those clubs (alone) under the Spanish
national sports act of 1990.91 Second, a transfer of land between the
City authorities of Madrid and Real Madrid on terms alleged to be so
favourable to the club that they amounted to state aid.92 Third, guarantees
given by the Valencia regional government for loans to support Valencia
CF, Hércules CF and Elche CF (all three clubs in the region of Valencia,
albeit in different cities) while the clubs were undergoing financial difficul-
ties.93 The Commission expressed a preliminary view in 2013 that the
88Case COMP/SA.41612 (2016) OJ L 282/53 [45]–[46]: Art. 165 is also mentioned at [59] in connection with
the restructured club’s social function, but this is entirely tangential to the economic analysis of the
restructuring plan.
89Case COMP/SA.41617, NEC [68].
90Case COMP/SA.40168, [48] and [51]. See also Case COMP/SA.41617 [77]–[78] and [82].
91Commission Decision of 18 December 2013, Case COMP/SA.29769, Spain – State aid to certain Spanish
professional sport clubs. These four clubs were allowed to be managed as members’ clubs (ie community
owned), whereas all other professional football clubs in Spain were forced to transform into a special
form of limited company (ie privately owned). This was enforced by the 1990 National Sports Act
(Law 10/1990), for more on this see Borja García, Alberto Palomar and Carmen Pérez ‘Spain: Parochialism
or Innovation?’ in Arne Niemann, Borja García and Wyn Grant (eds), The Transformation of European Foot-
ball (MUP 2010).
92Commission Decision of 18 December 2013, COMP/Case SA.33754, Spain – Real Madrid CF.
93Commission Decision of 18 December 2013, COMP/Case SA.36387, Spain – Alleged aid in favour of three
Valencia football clubs.
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measures in all three cases meet the criteria for state aid: they are financed
by state resources, they provide advantages to selected professional clubs
and they affect competition and trade between Member States. In that
respect, the case of Hércules CF is interesting, for this relatively small Ali-
cante-based club has been lingering in the second and third tiers of
Spanish football for years.
Here the outcome was radically different from that reached in the Dutch
cases. The Commission announced on 4 July 2016 that in the light of its
three separate in-depth investigations it had reached the conclusion that
public authorities in Spain had been guilty of granting aid that is incompa-
tible with the internal market to the seven professional football clubs. They
had, as a result, enjoyed an unfair advantage over their competitors, which
now falls to be eliminated by recovery of the aid in compliance with EU law.
The decision concerning RealMadrid, FC Barcelona, Athletic Club and CA
Osasuna finds that the tax breaks enjoyed by the four clubs offer them a
selective advantage of the type at which Article 107 is targeted.94 There
was, moreover, liable to be an effect on inter-State trade and a distortion
of competition. The decision concerning Real Madrid’s transfer of land is
founded on the conclusion that the transfer of land in question was not a
deal that a private market operator would have chosen to enter into.95
The City of Madrid had, in short, over-paid. Once this crucial assessment
had been arrived at, there was no escaping the classification of the transfer
as aid within the meaning of Article 107, since the other definitional pre-
requisites were clearly satisfied.
In both these two cases, concerning tax concessions and the transfer of
land, the Commission in its 2013 documentation had explicitly cited
Article 165 TFEU and the need to consider the specific nature of sport
in the context of application of the state aid rules, “as sport fulfils edu-
cational, public health, social, cultural and recreational functions” but it
noted too that “the economic importance of sport is growing con-
stantly”.96 It noted the absence of guidelines on the application of the
State aid rules to commercial sport activities. It noted too that Spain
does also not claim any public service mission of the professional sport
clubs, which could be assessed under Article 106(2) TFEU. An assessment
has therefore to be based on Article 107(3)(c) TFEU but the Commission
in 2013 was plainly sceptical that one could identify an objective of
94Case COMP/SA.29769 (n 91).
95Case COMP/SA.33754, Aid to Real Madrid.
96Case COMP/SA.29769 (n 91), para 30 of Commission letter, Case COMP/SA.33754, para 38 of Commission
letter.
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common interest which could justify selective support to such powerful
clubs in an intensely competitive market.
That scepticism is fully borne out in the decisions of 2016. In that per-
taining to Real Madrid, FC Barcelona, Athletic Club Bilbao and CA
Osasuna the Commission notes that the Spanish Liga Nacional de
Fútbol Profesional had referred to Article 165 TFEU in claiming the
rules in question were designed to promote the social responsibility of
clubs and that any fiscal effects were merely indirect.97 However,
neither Spain nor the recipient clubs themselves had claimed that any
of the exceptions foreseen by Articles 107(2) and (3) were applicable.
The Commission did not exclude that a connection might be made
between the promotion of the European dimension in sport recognized
by Article 165 and an objective of common interest within the meaning
of Article 107(3)(c), but this could not help to justify a tax scheme that
was not of general application but instead calculatedly selective. The Com-
mission required only six paragraphs to conclude that the aid was not
compatible with the internal market.98 It is now required that Spain
shall end the concession and recover the wrongfully unpaid taxes.99
In the decision concerning the transfer of land in favour of Real Madrid
theCommission concludes briskly that there is no route to finding the aid to
be compatible with the internal market. Its reasoning requires just four
short paragraphs, the core of which simply note that here too neither
Spain nor the club has claimed that any of the exceptions contained in
Article 107 apply.100 The club must therefore pay back a sum in excess of
€18million, which represents the benefit improperly conferred in violation
of EU law.101 The club decided not to appeal the Commission decision and
it recently paid the aid back to theMadrid city council, including the calcu-
lated interest, to a total of almost €20.3 million.102 Crucially, the Commis-
sion does not even mention Article 165 TFEU or Article 106(2) TFEU.
Sport is in this case not special. As in the Dutch cases the aid was not noti-
fied, but in contrast to the Dutch cases there was no saving this grant of aid
under EU law.
97Case COMP/SA.29769 (n 91) [18].
98ibid [84]–[89].
99The decision has been challenged: Case T-679/16, Athletic Club v Commission.
100Case COMP/SA.33754 (n 95) [133]–[136].
101One can hardly avoid noting that the club regularly pays transfer fees far in excess of this amount: this is
not an ailing football club.
102El Diario.es, ‘El Real Madrid devuelve al Ayuntamiento de Carmena 20,3 millones de ayudas irregulares
recibidas’ (4 November 2016) http://www.eldiario.es/politica/Real-Madrid-Ayuntamiento-Carmena-
irregulares_0_576742899.html accessed 23 November 2016.
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The decision concerning Valencia, Hércules and Elche contains a
careful analysis of the nature of the support granted and the financial pos-
ition of the clubs, and concludes that since a market investor would not
have acted in this way, the matter constituted an aid within the
meaning of Article 107 TFEU.103 In this case, the Commission in 2013
had linked assessment of whether aid may meet the criteria specified by
Article 107(3)(c) TFEU as apt to facilitate the development of certain
economic activities to Article 165’s reference to the promotion of Euro-
pean sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of
sport. But it remarked that the only recognizable objective seemed to be
rescue and restructuring, and that several requirements for a green light
under its Guidelines governing this type of aid were missing.
In its 2016 Decision on the Valencia trio of clubs, the Commission con-
firmed that the Guidelines on rescue and restructuring were not satisfied.
In contrast to the Dutch cases, there was no managed plan for cutting
costs and restoring the clubs to long-term financial viability. The
Spanish Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional argued for special treatment,
citing Article 165, and claimed to fulfil a public service, invoking Article
106(2).104 The Commission simply notes its obligation to take due
account of Article 165, but does not integrate it any further into its legal
analysis.105 Moreover it observes that professional football is supplied
by market forces, and so there is no need for the State to place public
service obligations on suppliers of such services; nor in any event had
Spain done so.106 Article 106(2) therefore did not assist. Sport, in the cir-
cumstances, was not special. A total in excess of €30 million must be
recovered from the clubs, most of it from Valencia CF, and both Hércules
and Valencia have lodged challenges to the Commission Decision before
the General Court.107
The Spanish cases join a pool of pre-existing cases that are essentially
straightforward as a matter of law. So, for example, the Commission,
acting on a complaint lodged by a German ski producer, agreed in a
decision of September 2012 that Slovenia had granted state aid in the
form of an injection of capital to the company Elan, engaged in the pro-
duction of winter sport equipment.108 The matter did not fall within the
103Case COMP/SA.36387, Aid to Valencia football clubs.
104ibid [48].
105ibid [101].
106ibid [102].
107Cases T-766/16 and T-732/16 respectively, pending.
108Commission Decision of 19 September 2012, Case COMP/SA.26379, Slovenia – Measures in favour of
ELAN d.o.o.
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Commission’s carefully drawn guidelines designed to allow (but limit) aid
for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.109 Nor did the aid come
even close to fitting the gateways envisaged by Article 107(3) TFEU. Slo-
venia was required to recover €10 million (plus interest) from the recipi-
ent. Crucially there was no sports-specific element to this case. This was
naked state aid. This conclusion was also at the core of the Commission’s
condemnation of the practices uncovered in Spain.
However, if the lesson of the Spanish cases decided in 2016 is that sport
is not special in law, a rather different story emerges when one thinks
about how sport is special in politics. The Spanish cases were further com-
plicated by the politics of the issue at stake, which seemed to have perme-
ated the Commission’s management of the dossiers. The Commission
delayed four years from receipt of a complaint about the preferential tax
treatment before opening this procedure and in fact in December 2013
the Ombudsman concluded that the Commission had failed to act in a
timely manner; it also suggested that the Commission had failed to allay
suspicions that the relevant Commissioner, Joaquín Almunia a member
and supporter of Athletic Club Bilbao, had a conflict of interest that
caused the inaction.110 According to its own Code of Best Practice, the
Commission should have decided within 12 months on whether it
would act on the complaint. The Ombudsman was not persuaded by
claims about the complexity of the matter and the lack of past practice
as reason for delay, forcing the Commission to speed up its management
of the case, which ended up with the decision to undertake an investi-
gation. This clearly demonstrates that this is a sensitive issue. This is
further emphasized by appreciation that since the aid was not notified
to the Commission, it counted as unlawful aid and it was therefore
open to competitor clubs (from Spain and beyond) to initiate legal pro-
ceedings before Spanish courts in order to prevent the recipients
keeping their unlawful gains. That no club chose to do so provides a
glimpse of the cartel that exists among football clubs, and highlights too
just how important is the supervisory role of the Commission as the
responsible public agency – even if, as in the Spanish cases, it showed
little enthusiasm to act swiftly. There is here an echo of sorts of the discri-
minatory nationality rules in football, which were condemned by the
109Commission, ‘Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Non-financial Undertakings in Dif-
ficulty’ (2014) OJ C249/1.
110European Ombudsman, ‘State Aid and European Football Clubs? Summary of Recommendation by the
European Ombudsman Following a Complaint Against the EU Commission’ (16 December 2013) http://
www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/52874/html.bookmark accessed 23
November 2016.
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Court of Justice in Bosman.111 They were not simply applied by UEFA
because the Commission was not inclined to intervene: the Commission
had in fact informally approved them despite their flagrant disrespect
for EU law’s core values.112 It took a private party – a footballer – to go
to court to crack open a cartel embracing UEFA, the clubs and the Com-
mission itself. The incestuous politics of sport governance are truly special.
4. Discussion: legal assessment – the interaction of Article 165
TFEU and EU’s state aid rules
Our research has presented here an evolving, although relatively consist-
ent, approach of the Commission to state aid and sport. Several con-
clusions can be extracted. Perhaps the first and more generic one is that
Article 165 TFEU is having an impact on the Commission’s reasoning.
Article 165 TFEU is not explicitly horizontal in nature, but the Commis-
sion is clearly relying on it to develop its application and interpretation of
the state aid rules. Thus, it is not a question of whether the special charac-
teristics of sport are taken into account, but rather of the extent to which
this is done. In fairness, this has been very much common practice of the
Commission even before the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty,113
but the new narrative is the extension of this approach to the state aid pro-
visions and so to the public sector.
Second, the Commission has been consistently considering different
types of measures as state aid, which should send a message to public auth-
orities when considering their spending in matters of sport policy. Each
case needs to be treated individually to ensure a justification under
Article 107(3)(c) TFEU and, in this respect, one emerging trend is that
the stronger the link to tangible community/social benefits, the more
likely are the arrangements to comply with the Commission’s
requirements.
Moving on from the more generic assessment, the Commission’s readi-
ness to treat the construction of arenas as an aspect of “State responsibil-
ity” is perhaps the most immediately striking aspect of these decisions.
Given its explicit linkage to Article 165 TFEU and the Amsterdam
Declaration on Sport this is where one may suppose that one finds an
acceptance that sport is special – with direct consequences for the
111Case C-415/93, Bosman (n 2).
112This is recorded at paras 126 and 136 of the ruling.
113Stephen Weatherill, ‘EU Sports Law: The Effect of the Lisbon Treaty’ in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and
Stefanie Ripley (eds), EU Law After Lisbon (OUP 2012) 403.
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interpretation for funding granted to sport when controlled by EU state
aid law. Basically, sport is special because of its social significance and,
therefore, the state is responsible for providing infrastructure in this
area of life to its citizens just as it is, for example, responsible for building
roads to improve transport or communication. This is certainly a bold
claim in relation to the role of sport in society and its legal implications,
and one that is doubtless immensely appealing to sports bodies and
clubs as recipients of grants by public authorities.
Where does the claim about “responsibility” originate? This is not easy
to answer. The Commission’s explanations are not uniform, but the claim
seems to originate in Ahoy.114 Copenhagen and Sweden/Uppsala offer no
citation in support of the assertion that the project engages a State respon-
sibility; France 2016 simply cites the decisions in Flanders, Sweden/
Uppsala and the three German cases.115 So we see the Commission
cross-referencing cases without providing a clear justification. Continuing
the trail, the Commission’s explanations in the three cases on stadia in
Germany, in Flanders and in Northern Ireland cite paragraph 67 of
Ahoy in support of the claim that State responsibility is engaged. In
Ahoy the Commission asserted:
[… ] the investment in the Arena is intended to provide a venue at which
activities will take place that are aimed at the general public. The provision
of a sports venue of this type can be regarded as a matter for which the auth-
orities are responsible to the general public, provided its multifunctional char-
acter is maintained.116
It should be noted that Ahoy was not the first case where the Commission
hinted at the state responsibility with regard to the public funding of
sports infrastructure. As described above, the Commission stated in
relation to the funding of the Hannover stadium that a football stadium
could be considered as being part of the typical responsibility of the
public authority to the general public.117 However, Ahoy (like the Hann-
over football stadium case) was not a case of state aid! In that Decision the
Commission placed the funding outwith the reach of the State aid rules
because of the absence of (inter alia) a selective advantage. So, in relying
on Ahoy to assert that State authorities are responsible to the general
public when they provide a sports venue, the Commission has in the
114Decission 2009/713, Ahoy (n 30).
115Case COMP/SA.35501, France Euro 2016, [269].
116Decission 2009/713 (n 30), [47] and [61].
117SEC (2007) 935, (n 49).
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subsequent Decisions transposed the reasoning in Ahoy to support an
analytically distinct finding – namely, that the financing provided is aid
but that it is nonetheless compatible with the internal market.
This is new in the sense that the Commission is plainly trying to ident-
ify a route through which to address sport’s special concerns in the appli-
cation of State aid law. However, State aid law is well accustomed to
dealing with funding for infrastructure projects. Support for infrastructure
projects will commonly escape the reach of the State aid rules in so far as it
constitutes an aspect of general economic policy pursued by the State.
However, once an element of selectivity infects the scheme, EU law
comes into play. Improving a motorway network will not count as State
aid – unless it is targeted on one particular region where a pool of particu-
lar undertakings will benefit. A State may choose a general tax regime
which it intends to give an advantage to all firms on its territory when
compared with firms based in other Member States, but once particular
firms are picked out to enjoy the benefit, the line has been crossed:
State aid is potentially involved, provided the other relevant criteria in
Article 107(1) are satisfied. The scheme will need Commission approval
to survive.
So, for example, the Commission has published Guidelines on the
application of State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broad-
band networks under an assumption that in order to secure provision of
widespread and affordable access to high-speed internet infrastructure
and service some public funding is needed to complement private invest-
ment.118 Where access to the subsidized infrastructure is open to all
sectors of the economy, State aid law has no say. However, it is different
where a broadband network is provided in favour of predetermined com-
panies that are not chosen according to general criteria applicable in the
entire area for which the granting authority is responsible. It is the identi-
fication of a selective advantage that pushes an initiative of general econ-
omic policy over the line into the terrain of State aid and the consequent
need to secure approval. Plenty of cases – decided by both Commission
and Court – show careful examination of whether this line has been
crossed, frequently in circumstances where public authorities are rather
implausibly seeking to deny or even conceal the selective nature of their
practices.119 Breadth of availability and non-discriminatory access to the
118(2013) OJ C25/1.
119See, for example, Leigh Hancher, Tom Ottervanger, and Pieter J. Slot, EU State Aids, 4th edn (Sweet and
Maxwell 2012), 58–75.
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created benefits are particularly significant in keeping supervision in the
name of state aid at bay.
One of the cases related to infrastructure is of high significance in
understanding the rising tide of Commission intervention into aid
granted in the sports sector, even though the matter itself did not
concern sport. Mitteldeutsche Flughafen AG and Flughafen Leipzig-
Halle GmbH v European Commission120 involved judicial review of the
Commission’s investigation into the building of a southern runway at
Leipzig-Halle airport. Public funding of air traffic control would be
typical of the exercise of official powers and, absent selective treatment,
would not fall within the scope of State aid law. However, the Court
agreed that public financing of the construction or extension of
airport infrastructure counted as an economic activity falling within
the scope of the State aid rules. That such an infrastructure project
might meet a clearly defined objective of general interest (in particular
regional development) is part of the assessment of whether the aid is
compatible with the internal market – it does not take the matter
outwith the reach of the rules. One may readily grasp the sensitivity
associated with this extended understanding of the scope of EU State
aid law by noting the protests advanced on appeal before the Court of
Justice that the decision of the General Court caused an unconstitutional
interference with the exclusive power of the Member States and a viola-
tion of the principle of subsidiarity. But such objections did not impress
the Court.121
Van Rompuy and van Maren claim that it was primarily the case law of
the EU courts that provided the Commission with propulsion to extend
the reach of State aid control into sport.122 Although the Commission’s
first Decision relating to aid for sports infrastructure was made in late
2011,123 they find that of particular significance in breaking the dam was
the General Court judgment of 24 March 2011 in Leipzig-Halle124 which,
by adopting a relatively broad interpretation of the scope of Article 107
120Joined Cases T-443/08 and T-455/08 and, on (unsuccessful) appeal, Case C-288/11 P, Mitteldeutsche
Flughafen AG and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle GmbH v European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2011:17 and EU:
C:2012:821 respectively.
121Case C-288/11P, Leipzig-Halle, [196]–[209].
122Ben Van Rompuy and Oskar van Maren, ‘EU Control of State Aid to Professional Sport: Why Now?’ in
Antoine Duval and Ben Van Rompuy (eds), The Legacy of Bosman: Revisiting the Relationship Between
EU Law and Sport (TMC Asser Press 2016), chapter 7.
123Commission Decision of 9 November 2011, Case COMP/SA.31722, Hungary – Supporting the Hungarian
sport sector via tax benefit scheme.
124Joined Cases T-443/08 and T-455/08 Mitteldeutsche Flughafen AG and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle GmbH v
European Commission.
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TFEU in such circumstances, provoked the Commission’s approach to the
public financing of sports infrastructure to become more muscular, even if
Leipzig-Halle itself was not concerned with sport. This in turn quickly led
to legislative codification of the Commission’s decisional practice in Article
55 of Regulation 651/2014. The Commission’s Decisions onmultifunctional
arenas follow the Leipzig-Hallemodel; so does Article 55 of Regulation 651/
2014. To this extent sport is not special. But the acceptance that the State has a
“responsibility” in thematter of providing sports arenas tends to improve the
likelihood that aid will be found to be compatible with the internal market
even where a selective advantage has unarguably been conferred. The
nudge to the Commission supplied byArticle 165 TFEU and theAmsterdam
Declaration on Sport leads it to laud sport’s educational, public health, social,
cultural and recreational functions and to employ this as a basis for favour-
able assessment of public funding for sports arenas. However, this is gener-
ous. These Decisions, supplemented now by Article 55 of the Block
Exemption Regulation 651/2014, make clear the requirement of wider and
non-discriminatory community access to the publicly funded arenas as a
condition of finding the aid compatible with EU law, but the reality
remains that theprincipal beneficiarieswill (often) tend tobe rich andpower-
ful professional football clubs. This is clear from the list of cases analysed.
Their commercial motivation is much harder to align with sport’s edu-
cational, public health, social, cultural and recreational functions. In fact,
one may argue that the Commission, by taking a very broad view of sport’s
virtues, is adopting an unduly benevolent view of professional sport, which
is mainly (though not exclusively) pursued for profit-making.
Strategically, however, this is the route for professional sport to seek to
exploit in order to carve out special protection for its interests in the appli-
cation of EU State aid law. The notion of State responsibility to support
sport offers a window to generous treatment of public funding for sporting
activities. The question is, how far will this stretch, and how far should it
stretch?
The Dutch and Spanish cases, and to some extent the 2001 Decision on
French football clubs’ academies,125 help to show the limits. In the infra-
structure cases, and even in the youth academies case, there is at least a
tangible outcome that can be linked to the social nature of sport and its
links to communities. Stadia may be used for different purposes. The
Commission may well be forced to further develop its thinking on
125Commission, ‘Commission Does Not Object to Subsidies for French Professional Sport Clubs’ (Press
release) IP/01/599, 25 April 2001.
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sports infrastructure by applying criteria on the use of the stadia for clear
and measurable socially useful purposes. In this respect it is necessary to
note the clear focus on the virtues of grassroots sport that Commission,
Council and Parliament have decided to take in their early implemen-
tation of the nascent EU Sport Policy.126
All this is certainly different from providing tax relief and other advan-
tages to single clubs, where the link to tangible community/social benefits
is rather tenuous once clubs have been considered as undertakings. Tax
benefits and similar measures also provide a more direct advantage to
the undertaking in the case, with a further potential to distort competition
in the market. Thus, whereas one could consider the Commission rather
generous in agreeing that the state is responsible to build sporting facili-
ties, there are instruments available to ensure these practices achieve
their stated objective, although this will of course require assertive policing
by the competition authorities. Where aid is granted to clubs to reduce
their operating costs, a quite different approach is merited, and it is
plainly visible in – most of all – the Dutch and Spanish decisions of
July 2016. These reveal a basically orthodox approach to assessment of
aid devoted to restructuring and rescue: one that has sport as the back-
ground, but one which would be familiar to those engaged in restructuring
aid across the economy more generally. Such aid is certainly not ruled out
– as the Dutch cases prove – but it is confined to the circumstances recog-
nized by the Commission’s Guidelines, as a concrete application of the
Article 107(3)(c) “gateway”, and the types of practices uncovered in
Spain are not acceptable. Sport is not in this matter special, and this is
amply demonstrated by the Commission’s lack of detailed concern for
Article 165 TFEU in the July 2016 Decisions.
5. Conclusion
The law of the internal market came relatively late to sport. Walrave127
was the first ruling of the Court of Justice which applied EU law to
sport, but it was the Bosman ruling in 1995 that was the trigger for an
explosion of interest and litigation in the matter.128 Bosman showed
that the Court would not yield absolute autonomy to sports governing
126For example, Commission Comunication, Developing the European Dimension in Sport (n 52); Resol-
ution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting
within the Council, on a European Union Work Plan for Sport for 2011–2014, (2011) OJ C162/1.
127Case C-36/74 Walrave (n 1).
128Case C-415/93 Bosman (n 2).
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bodies where their rules conflicted with the assumptions of EU free move-
ment law, but nevertheless the Court in Bosman left some interpretative
room in EU law for the expression of sport’s special features.129 Meca-
Medina is the landmark case that performed a similar job for the
shaping of EU competition law in the supervision of sporting practices
with economic effects.130 Article 165 TFEU captures this trend in its direc-
tion that EU law shall take account of “the specific nature of sport”. And
now state aid law too joins the party by bringing the role of public auth-
orities in sport’s economic model into focus. These are transformative
times: the determination of the extent to which sport is truly “special”
now falls to be decided in the context of the intervention of public
authorities.
The development of state aid law applied to sport over the last 10 years
is best understood as a process of testing just how rigorous shall be this
control exercised over aid that tends to “disrupt fair competition”.
Legally this is influenced by the need to inquire into whether the insertion
of Article 165 into the TFEU with effect from 2009 has changed the rules
of the game: in particular, does appeal to the “specific nature” of sport gen-
erate any more lenient understanding of the control exercised by state aid
law over subsidies to sports clubs.
The evolving practice reveals that the grant of support by public auth-
orities to sporting activities is reviewed in the light of both Articles 107–
109 TFEU and Article 165 TFEU. That means that sensitivity to sport’s
character is embraced by the Commission. This follows Bosman and
Meca-Medina. However, a detailed and case-by-case assessment is
required: this is no general amnesty for aid granted simply because the
recipient wears the clothes of sport. This too follows Bosman and Meca-
Medina. It is so far plain that the perceived social value of infrastructure
is treated as justifying a far more generous view of public support for sport
than is extended to more narrowly commercial benefits offered by public
authorities to particular (often ailing) football clubs. This begins to illumi-
nate an understanding of the possibilities but also the limits under EU law
of aid granted by public authorities to the sports sector. Sport deserves to
be treated as a special case, distinct from other areas of economic activity,
but not to the full extent claimed by some public authorities and sporting
bodies.
129ibid see especially para 106 of the judgment.
130Case C-519/04 Meca-Medina (n 5). See especially [43]–[45].
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